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# PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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THE latest contribution to the discussion of the so-called controversy between Science and Religion from a critical point of view is the work, "Religion as a Credible Doctrine," by Mr. William H. Mallock. In that work, Mr. Mallock maintains that the nineteenth century will be characterized in the annals of history as the battle-ground between the forces of religion and of science. This conflict, which has been waged with varying fortunes, is, he says, our heritage from the past, and he seizes the opening of a new century as an opportune time for setting forth the condition of both parties and the points at issue between them. Or, to use a metaphor he delights in, he proposes to sum up the debit and credit sides and present an accurate record of gains and losses. He thus appears in the humble rôle of "intellectual accountant."

Mr. Mallock has honored me by associating me with Father Maher, the learned English Jesuit, with Dr. Hettinger, and Dr. William G. Ward, of revered memory, as an exponent of Catholic teaching. In referring in a very friendly way to my work on Christian Philosophy,* he has been good enough to say that the conclusions which I have aimed at establishing in that treatise are the precise conclusions which he himself desires to exhibit as worthy of reasonable acceptance. But he takes exception to the methods which I have followed in reaching these conclusions. Mr. Mallock assumes that there is an insurmountable barrier between the religious and the scientific domain, and on that basis he pursues his investigations; whereas I have regarded the field from a higher standpoint, with the result that objects which, on a close view, seem to conflict or to be isolated from each other are discerned in this more comprehensive outlook, as coalescing in harmonious unity—not a unity of nature, such as the monism of Prof. Haeckel, for instance, would imply, but a unity of order. Now, I believe that this recent contribution of Mr. Mallock is nothing more than the repetition of a shibboleth now grown old, and that his discussion is superficial. I am confident that closer examination will reveal, more and more clearly as the years go on, the simple and far-reaching truth that, in the history of the human interpretation of the world and of man, the nineteenth century will stand forth not as a battle-ground between religion and science, but as a battle-ground between spurious philosophies, where the fundamental and priceless problem at issue was the dignity and powers of the human mind.

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* "Christian Philosophy; God."

The pendulum of thought swings from one extreme to the other. Thus, in philosophy we discern the trend of thought from Idealism to Materialism, and from Materialism back to Idealism. In literature, a romantic period is followed by a period whose dominant tone is realistic, and this in turn gives way to a subsequent idealism. The intellectual accountant whose main work is the balancing of accounts, is apt to view facts as figures and base the estimate on their face value. The philosophic mind welcomes facts gladly, but is not content with viewing them as figures. It investigates their causes, and is rewarded with the discovery that the facts apparent on the surface of the time-stream have a richer and deeper meaning, in so far as they are manifestations of currents more or less strong, more or less conflicting, agitating the minds and throbbing in the breasts of men.

## I.

An exact and profound knowledge of the problems which confront us is to be obtained only by viewing our mental life against the background of the lights and shadows cast by the struggles and victories and failures of those who have gone before.

The nineteenth century dawned with the rise of a philosophical system which boasted that it was destined to work in the world of mental science a revolution analogous to that which had been achieved by Copernicus in astronomy. With that claim by way of preface to the "Critic of Pure Reason," Emmanuel Kant published a work which has influenced the human mind profoundly for upwards of a hundred years. Copernicus revolutionized astronomical science by proving that the sun, not the earth, is the centre of the solar system. Kant maintained that truth, the light of our mental world, did not consist in conformity of thought to things, but resided in the mind alone. Reality must coincide with thought, not thought with reality. The mind thus becomes supreme, with no test, no guide, no restraining force outside of itself.

This doctrine of Subjective Idealism, expressed in careful language, with a parade of deep and abstruse reasoning, was adopted with enthusiasm by the learned world. Disciples sprang up on every side. Fichte developed the Idealism of his master into a Transcendental Egoism. This teaching profoundly influenced Carlyle and Emerson, and even to-day its traces are found in the associations of Ethical Culture. Hard on Fichte, came Schelling with the doctrine of the Absolute, and then Hegel, the last and greatest of Kant's followers, who was destined, by the grim irony of events, to deal the idealistic movement a blow from which it has never recovered. Space does not permit a minute examination of Hegel's teaching. Sixty years ago his name was supreme in the schools of Germany. But he developed Idealism too far; with the inevitable result that reaction followed. Hegel's own disciples split into warring bands in the effort to explain their master's teaching.

Thus, looking back over the lapse of fifty years, we are brought face to face with vivid scenes of a rapidly shifting panorama. First, we behold a great multitude in loud acclaim of the Hegelian system of philosophy as the greatest achievement of the human mind; then, a few groups with diverse shreds of a dismembered system, each crying out the absurdities of the other, each proclaiming that it alone possessed the real doctrine, and in that very proclamation falling into absurdities more glaring still; then, the world looking on in amazement and doubt with the questions, What is Truth? and Is it in the care of such as these, or is it not somewhere else after all? Finally, we see these same onlookers turning away from the strife of a broken and extravagant Idealism, and seeking truth in the material things which could be grasped by sense observation and experiment. The physical sciences dealing with the various aspects of material nature were then making giant strides, and men gloried in the possession of a sure and undisputed source of knowledge.

The science of the physical universe, acquired by patient investigation into its phenomena and laws, is a triumph of the human mind. It is a characteristic and glory of the nineteenth century. The method pursued in this department of mental activity is known as the method of Induction. But the inductive method was not the discovery of our later times. Aristotle described the process, and a most interesting section of the "Summa" of St. Thomas Aquinas is that part wherein he investigates, by means of this method, the virtues and vices even of our ethical life. Furthermore, a careful examination of the processes employed in physical science will show that the inductive method is only a part of the scientific method. Induction leads from facts or phenomena to the formulation of laws or hypotheses. But the laws must be applied to facts constantly recurring to observation; the hypotheses must be verified before they have any weight. Now the application of laws to facts and the verification of hypotheses are not features of Induction in its more restricted sense. They accompany it and are supplementary to it; yet they are more properly termed processes of Deduction. Hence except when reinforced by deductive features the inductive method has proved inadequate for the acquisition of scientific truth. In our ordinary life, the two methods are in like manner employed. Do we not apply the rules or principles, or truths, whatever the name may be, acquired by past experience with men and things to the elucidation of events which succeed one another in the swiftly moving moments of the day? The nature of the human mind has not changed in these few hundred years which, according to Mr. Mallock, mark the passage from the theological to the scientific period of thought. The scientific spirit of our later days has only shown the necessity of careful observation and experimentation, and that in the field of physical nature hitherto imperfectly explored by the mind.

The recourse to investigation of the physical world, with the insistence on the processes of careful observation and experimentation, was a distinct gain to the cause of human knowledge. But, in the flood-tide of a reaction against a spurious Idealism, and in the enthusiasm born of abounding success in the discovery of material truth, scientists exceeded just limits. The great problems of existence, of origin and destiny, which are ever present to the mind, still remained to be dealt with and challenged solution. With these problems confronting them, some of the leading scientists, not content with the condemnation of a false philosophy nor with their own proper work of ascertaining and classifying the facts of material nature, set up a philosophy of their own based entirely on the limited knowledge of physical things. Mental and ethical life were regarded as phases of the material world, and the laws of physics were held to reign in rigid sway throughout. The result was the creation of a new system of philosophy, exaggerated and partial like the Hegelian Idealism, but at the opposite extreme.

Thus we see the rise of a philosophical school which held sway during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Its teaching has been termed Naturalism, because it denies the Supernatural and admits no revelation other than that obtained through the manifestation of the laws which exist in the material universe. By others, it is termed Positivism, because it teaches that we can know only things capable of positive and material proof. Again, it is called Agnosticism, because it professes to know nothing of the soul, of God, or of truth other than that obtained by sense-observation and experiment. A better term would be Science-Philosophy, because its inherent contradiction is revealed in this name. Certain it is, the new doctrine cannot be called Science, for positive science, to cite the words of M. Berthelot, "investigates neither first sources nor the ends of things, but it establishes facts and connects them by their immediate relations. . . The mind ascertains these facts by observation and experiment." The exponents and defenders of the Science-Philosophy were brilliant and versatile, but by no means profound. Its sway has passed with their death. The growing strength of a new philosophical movement is rapidly relegating it to a place in past history. Hence we can understand in its full force the lament of Mr. Mallock: "The pens of our Huxleys and Tyndalls and Darwins lie where they fell; and there is none left in strength among us to sum up the issue of that struggle, with knowledge and sympathy."

This Protean system, as has been said, is not Science, although it insistently claimed the title. It was a philosophy, different from, yet for the time more dangerous than, other philosophies which have sprung up in the course of history. Its home was not in the secluded quiet of university life; its advocates were not retiring students. On the street, in the newspapers, during the short intervals of daily labor, in the home, its doctrines were discussed and vigorously defended. At the same time, earnest thinkers, men like Agassiz, Pasteur, Secchi, Claude Bernard, arose to attack the pretensions of the new philosophy. To them, as the preservers of science, is due the gratitude of mankind. They took the weapons so lauded by their opponents, and, by the use of a rigorous induction from well-ascertained facts, they pierced the bubble of this inflated system. Among them are to be found men of strong religious convictions, of great scientific achievement, who resented the unwarranted attack upon the priceless heritage of faith, falsely made in the name of science. They clearly perceived the fallacy of a philosophy masquerading in the guise of physical science, and they labored earnestly to tear aside the mask, to separate the false from the true, and let science stand forth in its true light before the gaze of men.

I do not deny that there were opponents of Science-Philosophy who had little to offer by way of a consistently reasoned philosophical system in place of what they rightly attempted to destroy. A glance over the variously modified systems of philosophic thought in Germany during the past fifty years, shows how weak and insufficient at times was the remedy suggested. The Hegelian Idealism which occasioned the rise of the Science-Philosophy, also contained in its own beginnings the fruitful seeds of doubt. Hamilton tried to combine Kant and Reid, with the result that, on the one hand, he produced Huxley who coined the word "Agnosticism," and, on the other, Mansel who proposed the system of his master as an irrefutable philosophic defence of Christian faith. Thus, Huxley, a leader of the Science-Philosophy, was the direct result of a false philosophical system; and the conflict between reason and faith, so apparent in recent English literature, is the offspring of false philosophical principles. The same spirit of scepticism prevailed in the Kantian offshoots throughout Germany and France. As a result, reason and faith, far from being recognized as existing in just and harmonious accord, are placed by this false system in the position of interminable strife. Hence, Christian faith is retained, if retained at all, only in apparent contradiction to reason; and reason, if consistently adhered to, leads to the abandonment of faith. In illustration, I cite Mr. Mallock's closing chapters. He openly proclaims not only that the conclusions in one department of human knowledge contradict the conclusions in another, but that "each in its last analysis contradicts itself." Thus, we may admit the truth of two contradictory doctrines, "without doing any more violence to our intellect than we are compelled to do implicitly whenever we believe anything." If there is meaning in these words, it is that they are a restatement of Kant's antinomies. And in presenting, by way of conclusion, his own convictions as to the proof for God's existence, Mr. Mallock openly adopts Kant's well-known distinction of theoretical and practical reason, confesses that the former leads to contradictions, and that the latter alone, in the categorical imperative, with its implied sense of responsibility, gives the sure basis for our belief in God.

Is Mr. Mallock aware that the distinction between theoretical and practical reason is without foundation; that the categorical "ought" of Kant is nothing more than the arbitrary dictum of the individual will; that these principles which he calmly proposes as the final and best answer of the mind on the validity of God's existence, are the fruitful sources of Agnosticism in Philosophy, of Individualism in Ethics, of Anarchism in Sociology?

I have tried to point out that, in discussing the alleged conflict between Science and Religion, an examination of the terms is of primary importance. The truth has been brought out that Physical Science was not a party to any conflict, that the real issue was between the false pretensions of a Science-Philosophy and the variously modified forms of Idealism, which, however specious, proved upon closer analysis to be narrow, inconsistent and false. This explains the chaos of thought which resulted in a widespread spirit of doubt. Thus, we are brought to a consideration of the statement made in the opening of the present article, that the vital problem at stake in the nineteenth century was the dignity and nature of the human mind.

The possession of a spiritual soul endowed with intelligence and free-will gives to man a peculiar position in the visible universe. In one way or another, the Science-Philosophy bitterly assailed this truth and contended that man was only an animal, thus making Psychology a part of Physiology or Biology. Others more radical and consistent, attempted to explain human nature by the principles of Physics and reduced human life to the laws of motion. A luminous illustration is Mr. Mallock's appeal to the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism in the effort to destroy the distinction between mind and matter, and to force the reader to accept as the creed of modern science either the Unknowable of Mr. Spencer, with its confusion of the notions of substance and essence, or the one substance of Spinoza, with its modern development into the Double-Aspect theory. The attempt was a failure. A careful analysis of our mental operations shows that thought and free-will are utterly unlike the activities manifested in the brute or inanimate world. In common with the brute, we possess sense-life; but, over and above, we rejoice in the activities of a mind which can form abstract and universal notions, can analyze, synthesize and carry on a sustained process of carefully reasoned thought. The power of free-will, with its sense of responsibility, is not the capacity to act without a cause or motive, but the power of choice between acting or not acting, or between various courses of action proposed by the mind. The powers of self-consciousness and of self-determination are the crown and glory of our spiritual nature. The one is not to be separated from the other. In vain we seek an explanation of them in Physiology, Biology or Physics. The process of reasoning by which this truth is ascertained consists in the application of the laws of Induction and the Method of Residues to the phenomena of conscious experience. The admission of a spiritual or super-organic principle to explain the spiritual or super-organic operations of the mind and will, is forced by pure stress of evidence upon the mind of the unbiased seeker for truth. The proof of a spiritual soul in a man is a vindication of human dignity and a triumph for human knowledge. The narrow limits of a Science-Philosophy are broken down, and the scope of philosophical observation is broadened and enriched. In addition to the department of Physical Science, we behold the spheres of mental and of moral life. They are not blended one into the other, but each stands forth clear and distinct, each with its own wealth of truth to be acquired by processes carried on in accordance with its own subject-matter and laws.

In broadening the sphere of human knowledge by the elevation of Psychology and of Ethics to the dignity of special sciences, distinct from the sciences which investigate the material world, the need is felt of a rigid inquiry into the nature of the mind, of a complete and exact description of the laws and processes which govern it in its pursuit of truth. The great result of the labor of Socrates was the rout of the Sophists by his insisting on the value of definite concepts. He thus removed the shadows of doubt, and brought about the free activity of thought. Hence arose the splendid monuments of human reason left in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Some hundreds of years later, St. Thomas Aquinas gathered together the scattered fragments of truth and welded them into the system of Scholastic Philosophy, the greatest production of carefully reasoned thought the world has ever seen. A like labor is incumbent on the present. The work most needed to-day is a Theory of Knowledge, written with a clear conviction of the dignity and powers of the mind, and in sympathetic knowledge of the struggles and doubts of those who have immediately gone before. The materials are at hand, but the work itself will show in a clearer and more detailed manner what I have tried briefly to point out, viz., that the nineteenth century is characterized not by a conflict between Religion and Science, but by a bitter conflict of rival philosophies, and that the fundamental issue is the dignity and validity of human reason.

## II.

Turning now from the general proof of my thesis set forth in the preceding pages, I shall deal with a special illustration furnished by Mr. Mallock. He repeatedly cites Professor Haeckel as the leading representative of Science. Now, I maintain that, whatever claim Professor Haeckel may have to the title of scientist, he certainly is also a philosopher. He comes before us as an exponent of the Science-Philosophy. When Professor Haeckel discusses the problems of God's existence, of human freedom and immortality, he is no longer a scientist. He has passed beyond the field of observation and experimentation on physical facts, and entered the domain of metaphysics, which is the proper sphere of philosophy. The problems of origin and destiny are beyond the range of physical science. Even a biologist, like Professor Haeckel, should not presume, as a scientist, to discuss and solve the origin of primitive life. The philosopher may make the attempt, and in so doing he will subject his reasoning and conclusions to rigid criticism. Thus, in making this attempt, Professor Haeckel is a philosopher, and the aspects of his teachings cited and approved by Mr. Mallock are the conclusions of a philosopher, and as such we shall briefly review them.

First of all, Professor Haeckel is guilty of the false use of the term science, which he employs as if it were restricted to physical science. This is an undue narrowing of human knowledge and is in direct contradiction to our conscious experience. There are mental science and moral science as well as physical science. Each presents the results of investigations pursued in its own special field, according to its own methods. The processes of thought properly carried out in the examination of any department of human knowledge are justly termed scientific.

Again, Professor Haeckel is obliged to face a serious difficulty in explaining the origin of life. He proposes the theory of spontaneous generation. If that theory be false, he admits that his whole system falls to the ground. Fifty years ago, this statement could be put forth without much fear of the consequences. Appeal could have been made to the facts of obvious experience, as illustrated in the generation of flies and bugs from putrid matter. Since then, however, Pasteur and Tyndall have proved conclusively, by a long and careful series of experiments, that life can only come from life, and that the dictum, *omne vivum e cellula,* formulates a scientific truth. The opponents of the Science-Philosophy justly called attention to this fact and demanded an answer. Did Professor Haeckel abandon his system, or attempt to modify it in accordance with the truths of science which he so loudly acclaims? On the contrary, he grows indignant and appeals to the unknown. In present conditions, he admits, the law of Biogenesis holds sway, but what of the primitive stage when life first made its appearance on the globe? The conditions then *might be* such, he suggests, that life did not come from life but from inorganic matter. In reply, it can be said that *what we do know* is, that the law of Biogenesis is a fundamental law of Biology, that Astronomy teaches the formation of the earth from a primitive nebula, and Geology proves that in the eozoic age of our planet there were no signs of life upon it. We accept this teaching and propound it, not with a view to establish the religious nature of man, as Mr. Mallock suggests, but to show the existence of God as the author of life. If our reasoning does not hold—that is, if the law of Biogenesis did not apply to primitive life, and if primitive life came from non-living matter—then a law of Biology has actually changed. What becomes of science on the supposition that the laws of material nature were in primitive times other than they are now, it is not for me to explain. Our position is strong, and cannot be affected by the unsupported assertions of the Science-Philosophers. And, if we consider the problem without regard to those who are interested in its discussion, we can maintain that the truths of science—as distinguished from the mere guesses and speculations of the Science-Philosophers—are not antagonistic to the conclusions of philosophy, that we are not forced to accept conclusions which hopelessly contradict each other. The ascertained facts and laws of physical science we gladly admit. The philosophical inferences therefrom are regarded as certainties, or as endowed with greater or less probability, in proportion to the weight of evidence supporting them and the rigid accuracy of the reasoning process by which they have been reached. The law of Biogenesis is in possession, and our inference is based on that admitted truth. The law of Abiogenesis has not a shred of evidence to favor its acceptance.

Another contention very dear to Professor Haeckel, and to the exposition of which Mr. Mallock devotes many pages, is the theory of evolution. This may be regarded as the framework in the edifice of Science-Philosophy, just as the law of Abiogenesis is its corner-stone. Now, what is there in the theory of Evolution? Some fifty years ago an ardent and patient young scientist discovered data which forced him to change his opinion on the development of some forms of life. But had mankind up to that time been ignorant that there is a law of growth, and that growth is a law of life? Jesus repeatedly draws illustrations from this biological law, and before the publication of "The Origin of Species" appeared the "Development of Christian Doctrine" by John Henry Newman. Men knew, in a general way, that living things grow, and that there were limits to the growth of the individual. They possessed, however, no minute knowledge of the various methods of generation, or of the laws governing the processes of growth. By close observation of the forms of life, Darwin discovered certain modifications and influences—*e. g.*, environment—whose scientific value had not been generally recognized. Immediately the world rang with plaudits over a great discovery. A new name was coined, and Evolution was proposed as a theory with a universal application. I do not wish to disparage a scientific discovery. I admit that Darwin's labors opened a new field of investigation which has been of great interest and value to Biology. Life and the laws of life are full of mysteries, and the growth of an embryo, like the growth of a child's mind, gives rise to beautiful and profound reflections. The secret of Darwin's fame was that he turned our gaze to the laws of growth and showed that our eyes were holden to things about us. Science scored a triumph and every candid mind gloried in the achievement. But when Evolution, with its beautiful kernel of truth, was seized by the Science-Philosophers and proposed by them as an explanation of the universe and of man, it ceased to be a problem of science and became forthwith a problem of philosophy. God was ruled out of the world and a hypothesis assumed sway. The abstract idea of growth was extended into a theory, and men forgot that living things differ in nature one from another, and that the character of the development was determined by the nature of the being.

As an illustration in point, let us take the alleged evolution of man from the brute. Science-Philosophy professedly teaches this form of development. Investigation of brute life shows that the animal possesses sense organs and sense knowledge. Psychology teaches that man has sense-life and sense-knowledge and is, therefore, an animal; but, over and above this knowledge, he is endowed with intelligence and free-will. The operations of mind are of a different order from the operations of sense. The mind abstracts, judges and reasons from the data of sense. Modern English Psychology in the term "thought" includes the operations of intellect and of sense. This confusion has had disastrous consequences in the philosophy of mental life. The use of the one term "thought" to designate two classes of operations different in kind served to obliterate the radical difference between them and make the passage from one to the other, or the designation of one for the other, simple and natural to the untrained mind. Nevertheless, the difference is there and can never be blotted out by a fallacious logomachy. The distinction of sense and intellect is a fundamental psychological fact, and it only can account for the diverse operations of the mind. The theory of evolution is impotent to bridge this chasm. A likeness in the nature of things must be shown. This, evolution has not yet shown and never will be able to show.

## III.

A final proof of the main contention of this article shall be taken from the acts of one who stands before the world as its greatest living statesman and prophet. Throughout a pontificate longer than ordinarily falls to the successor of St. Peter, Leo XIII. has proved himself by repeated acts to be an illustrious benefactor of mankind. Singularly endowed with great powers of mind, trained by a long and varied experience in the conduct of men and in the management of affairs, he brings to his high office a mature wisdom which has reflected signal glory on his reign. Almost his first act after election to the Pontificate was the publication, in 1878, of the encyclical "*Aeterni Patris.*" With the eye of a seer, he looks out into the world and detects the cause of the confusion and doubt which so profoundly disturbed the mind of his generation. He saw that men were in darkness because false philosophical systems had cast baneful shadows over the mind. He repeatedly insists that there is not and cannot be any conflict between Science and Religion. He realizes that a false philosophy, whether clothed in the garb of science, or built upon an erroneous interpretation of mental life, is the element which brings discord into the harmonious blending of knowledge. Not content with indicating the evil, he proposes the remedy. Looking into the treasury of truth, he selects the Scholastic Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas as the beacon which will cast a clear light on the troubled mind of the nineteenth century.

Thus was ushered in the Neo-Scholastic period. We find its beginnings farther back in the Latin works of Liberatore, in Trendelenberg, in Barthélemy St. Hilaire. But with the encyclical of the Holy Father an enthusiasm for the study was aroused. The "Summa" of St. Thomas became the text-book in Catholic schools, the principles which form its framework were spread abroad through publications in every language. The broad view, the clear thought, the sound doctrine, the exact expression so characteristic of the Angelic Doctor, exerted a deep and wide influence. The spirit of calm and solidity which gave to Scholastic Philosophy its strong hold on the mind of the Middle Ages breathed through the teachings of the Neo-Scholastic school. Writers came forth to face the motley array of current philosophies, with a clear knowledge of the weakness in their adversaries and confident in the possession of a strong, carefully reasoned system of truth concerning the universe and man. A true philosophy brought into harmony the scattered and partially obscured rays of truth. It dispelled the clouds of doubt which hung so long over the minds of men. It showed the true sphere and work of physical science, urged it to pursue its fruitful labors, and was the first to acclaim the discovery of physical laws or facts.

I do not deny that Neo-Hegelianism in England contributed, in no small degree, to usher in the new movement. But its value was rather negative, in so far as it helped to overthrow the Science-Philosophy by an insistence on the conscious facts of mental and of ethical life. No modification, however, of a system radically erroneous, as was Hegel's Idealism, can hope for any length of time to retain a hold on the mind. Thus, it cannot present a broad, sound and consistent theory of knowledge or of ethics. In this, its positive side, it betrays an inferiority to Neo-Scholasticism. There we have a clear and true presentation of mental life, an exact and profound system of morals, and a just estimate of investigation into the material universe, all uniting to form a magnificent structure with no gap or jar to mar its integrity.

I have endeavored to make my purpose clear. The line of thought and the principles set forth in this article are followed out in detail and applied to the special problem of God's existence in my work on Christian Philosophy, which Mr. Mallock has criticised. What I maintain is, that a sound philosophy should recognize the truth of physical, of mental and of moral science; that it should be broad and profound, clear and exact, so as to keep intact the limits of each, to prevent one from conflicting with the other, and thus build up in all fulness and proportion the magnificent structure of human knowledge.

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